Books

• The Simplicity of Identity, (forthcoming, 2025), Padova University Press

• Piccola guida filosofica all’identità personale, (2023), pp.176, EditoriLaterza, Roma-Bari. ISBN:978-88-5815-092-4

Journal articles and book chapters

• “Deeply Personal. A (not so) Counterintuitive Theory of Personhood”, with M. Viola (2026). in Philosophy & Technology
  
  

• "The Virtual as Personal" (2026). Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy. 16 (74): 197-215
  
  

• “Avatars as Parts: A Reply to Sweeney” (2025), Minds and Machines 35 (29): 1-18. 2025.
  
  

• “Two Geometrical Models for Pixelism” (2020), in Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics. DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0002
   

• “Persons, Reasons, and What Matters: The Philosophy of Derek Parfit” (2019), in Argumenta: Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 5 (1): 9-10. DOI 10.14275/2465-2334/20199.int
  

• “Parfitians as Exdurantists” (2017), in Axiomathes, 27, pp. 721-729. DOI: 10.1007/s10516-017-9331-9
  

• “Razionalità e comportamento responsabile: per una teoria davidsoninana radicale” with S. Iaquinto (2013). In (ed.) Andreozzi M., Castiglione S., Massaro A., Emotività animali: ricerche e discipline a confronto, LED, Milano. ISBN 978-88-7916-663-8
   

Review

• Perconti P., Coscienza, Il Mulino, Bologna (2011), pp. 210 (with S. Iaquinto), in Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 4:1, pp. 102-105, 2013.
   

Miscellanea

• “Sul concetto di ‘persona’ nelle Piccole persone di Anna Maria Ortese” (2024). In ed. Devoto G., Trasparenze Nuova Serie 12/2024, pp. 128-147. ISBN: 9788874943678

Work in progress

Journal articles

•  "From Extended Minds to Extended Persons", (with G. Spolaore) under review - 2nd round.
  What if our mind is not confined inside the boundaries of the skull but is something that spreads into the world? Does the fact that our mind extends into the environment, as Clark & Chalmers (1998) argue, impact personal identity? This paper explores the consequences of the Extended Mind Thesis (EM) on personal identity, mainly focusing on how an extended mind might lead to what I call an "extended person". We can interpret the Extended Person Thesis (henceforth, EP) in two ways. We can consider persons "extended" when the properties constituting their personhood are exemplified (either partially or fully) by something outside themselves ("Weak Extended Person Thesis", WEP). Alternatively, a stronger position holds that persons are extended when parts beyond the physical boundaries constitute them. This view is the "Strong Extended Person Thesis" (SEP). I argue that SEP follows from EM.
  
  

•  “'I' Can't Stop Being a Person. Temporal Parts and Person Essentialism” ,  under review
  This paper defends the compatibility of Person Essentialims (PE) and the psychological criterion by adopting a four-dimensionalist ontology. I show that the counterintuitive implications of PE rest on a semantic ambiguity. By employing a contextualist semantics for first-person pronouns and proper names, we can explain how terms like "I" and "Sally" refer to different fusions of temporal parts (person-fusions vs. human-fusions) depending on conversational context. Finally, I translate different versions of PE into four-dimensional terms by defining Weak Person Essentialism as the claim that persons are maximal fusions of personal temporal parts and framing Strong Person Essentialism within counterpart theory. Specifically, I suggest that context selects a personal counterpart relation grounded in natural Lockean properties, so that all salient counterparts of a person are essentially persons.
  

• “Referential Electromagnetism and the Extended Mind” (with G. Lando), under review
  The theory of the extended mind (EM) by Clark and Chalmers (1998) suggests that cognitive processes can extend beyond the brain and body to include external tools. However, the vague criteria for defining extensions risk an overpopulation of minds, with overlapping or nested minds. This paper examines this "overpopulation risk" and explores two responses: resisting by refining restrictive criteria or accepting multiple minds. We argue that semantic tools, such as Lewis’ reference magnetism and Haslanger & Yablo’s (2024) electromagnetic approach, can address this issue. These frameworks help identify referents for "minds" while balancing scientific rigor and conceptual amelioration, supporting EM’s plausibility.

•  “Being in the game: The Metaphysics of Video-game Characters” (with E. Olson),  advanced draft
  What do we refer to when we talk about video-game characters? Do they exist?  This paper evaluates the ontological status of digital characters, arguing that the debate surrounding them is primarily semantic rather than strictly metaphysical. We assess four competing frameworks. The deflationary view dismisses characters as non-existent pretenses, failing to account for characters based on real entities. The concrete view posits characters as physical data structures, but stumbles on the "problem of metafiction"—the fact that a single character spans multiple games and physical consoles. The subtle-and-sophisticated view attempts a hybrid type-token approach, yet physical data structures remain semantically invisible to players. Ultimately, we argue that the abstract view—treating characters as abstract universals akin to literary figures—best accommodates cross-platform persistence. We conclude that any viable account must classify these entities as either abstract or concrete, with the abstract view offering the most robust semantic framework for ordinary gaming discourse.

• "Make it (Potentially) Whole. A Counter-Mereological Paraphrasis for Nihilism, advanced draft
  This paper focuses on Cotnoir’s (2013) counterpart-theoretic framework for mereological nihilism, which reinterprets mereological relations as intensional across possible worlds. While this recovers classical mereology, it relies on heterogeneous extended simples. We argue that we can improve this strategy by integrating Casati and Varzi’s (1999) mereotopological treatment of undetached parts as "potential objects." Using counterpart theory, potential parts are partial counterparts of wholes in other worlds. We can define a "potential sum" as an arrangement of mereological atoms whose counterparts successfully compose. Just as the undetached half of a board is not an object to be included in an inventory of the world over and above the board itself, mereological fusions are not objects over and above their atoms. This mereotopological framing offers a semantic solution for the nihilist. Statements about ordinary wholes are made true by specific modal facts: the actual atoms have counterparts arranged such that they successfully compose the corresponding object in accessible worlds. This provides a robust semantics for ordinary language while remaining strictly atomistic, bypassing the need for heterogeneous extended simples.

• “A Four-Dimensional Account of Digital and Virtual Artifacts” (with C. Peri), draft
  How do digital and virtual artifacts persist through time? In this paper, we argue that their unique temporal profiles are best captured by a four-dimensionalist framework. At the physical token level, digital artifacts frequently undergo executional interruptions, server migrations, and updates. Because they survive these temporal gaps and substrate changes, they cannot be "wholly present" at every moment of their existence. Instead, they persist as temporally extended wholes composed of successive temporal parts. We then extend this analysis to virtual artifacts, such as avatars and in-game objects. While virtual artifacts are individuated by their functional roles rather than their underlying code, they exhibit the exact same discontinuous temporal patterns. Consequently, if a four-dimensional account best explains the survival of digital artifacts across inactive phases and re-instantiations, it is equally necessary for understanding the persistence of virtual artifacts.

• "Oneiric Temporal Parts” (with H. Luzio), early draft
  What is the relation between a person and what she is and does in her dreams? In this paper, we argue that persons persist in dreams by having oneiric temporal parts, i.e., non-physical temporal parts connected to biological ones by a unity relation.