Books

• The Simplicity of Identity, (forthcoming, 2025), Padova University Press

• Piccola guida filosofica all’identità personale, (2023), pp.176, EditoriLaterza, Roma-Bari. ISBN:978-88-5815-092-4

Journal articles and book chapters

• “Avatars as Parts: A Reply to Sweeney” (forthcoming, 2025), Minds and Machines. 

• “Introduction to the New Italian Edition of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons” (forthcoming, 2025), Il Saggiatore.
  
  

• “Two Geometrical Models for Pixelism” (2020), in Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics. DOI: 10.1515/mp-2019-0002
   

• “Persons, Reasons, and What Matters: The Philosophy of Derek Parfit” (2019), in Argumenta: Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 5 (1): 9-10. DOI 10.14275/2465-2334/20199.int
  

• “Parfitians as Exdurantists” (2017), in Axiomathes, 27, pp. 721-729. DOI: 10.1007/s10516-017-9331-9
  

• “Razionalità e comportamento responsabile: per una teoria davidsoninana radicale” (with S. Iaquinto), (2013), in (ed.) Andreozzi M., Castiglione S., Massaro A., Emotività animali: ricerche e discipline a confronto, LED, Milano. ISBN 978-88-7916-663-8
   

Review

• Perconti P., Coscienza, Il Mulino, Bologna (2011), pp. 210 (with S. Iaquinto), in Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 4:1, pp. 102-105, 2013.
   

Miscellanea

• “Sul concetto di ‘persona’ nelle Piccole persone di Anna Maria Ortese” (2024), in ed. Devoto G., Trasparenze Nuova Serie 12/2024, pp. 128-147. ISBN: 9788874943678

Work in progress

Journal articles

• “Virtual personal identity”, under review.
  In this paper, I focus on the way virtual reality influences our personal identity. I consider Floridi’s (2014) onlife concept, supporting the idea that persons extend in physical and virtual realms. I combined Chalmer’s (2017) virtual digitalism with four-dimensionalism, claiming that our virtual counterparts are analogous to temporal counterparts. In doing so, I introduce the concept of virtual parts as temporal parts in a virtual world.
  
  

•  "From Extended Minds to Extended Persons", (with G. Spolaore) under review.
  What if our mind is not confined inside the boundaries of the skull but is something that spreads into the world? Does the fact that our mind extends into the environment, as Clark & Chalmers (1998) argue, impact personal identity? This paper explores the consequences of the Extended Mind Thesis (EM) on personal identity, mainly focusing on how an extended mind might lead to what I call an "extended person". We can interpret the Extended Person Thesis (henceforth, EP) in two ways. We can consider persons "extended" when the properties constituting their personhood are exemplified (either partially or fully) by something outside themselves ("Weak Extended Person Thesis", WEP). Alternatively, a stronger position holds that persons are extended when parts beyond the physical boundaries constitute them. This view is the "Strong Extended Person Thesis" (SEP). I argue that SEP follows from EM.
  
  
  

•  “To be essentially a person. A reply to Olson & Witt” ,  advanced draft
  In this short paper, I reply to Olson & Witt’s (2020) critique the notion of Lockean person essentialism, They argue that this view leads to counterintuitive outcomes, such as the idea that individuals cease to exist if they lose personhood due to conditions like severe dementia. The paper proposes a response using the concept of temporal parts within a four-dimensional framework. Two approaches are considered: (a) each temporal part of a person must possess personhood, and (b) person-stages are essentially parts of a four-dimensional person-object. The latter aligns more closely with person essentialism and suggests that essential properties apply to wholes rather than parts.
  

• “Deeply Personal. Digital abuses on our digital extended persons” (with M. Viola),  advanced draft
  This paper addresses the ethical concerns surrounding deepfake technology, particularly Nonconsensual Pornographic Deepfakes (NPD), which misrepresent individuals. Some moral philosophers argue that NPD violates the Kantian imperative to treat individuals as ends, not means. Victims report feeling personally violated, despite the harm affecting only their digital simulacra. This raises the question of whether NPD should be considered part of a person in a metaphysical sense. We propose an extended notion of personhood that includes digital simulacra, distinguishing "person" from "human being." By viewing persons as aggregates of biological and digital temporal parts, this framework explains the personal violation felt from NPD.
  

• “Referential Electromagnetism and the Extended Mind” (with G. Lando), advanced draft
  The theory of the extended mind (EM) by Clark and Chalmers (1998) suggests that cognitive processes can extend beyond the brain and body to include external tools. However, the vague criteria for defining extensions risk an overpopulation of minds, with overlapping or nested minds. This paper examines this "overpopulation risk" and explores two responses: resisting by refining restrictive criteria or accepting multiple minds. We argue that semantic tools, such as Lewis’ reference magnetism and Haslanger & Yablo’s (2024) electromagnetic approach, can address this issue. These frameworks help identify referents for "minds" while balancing scientific rigor and conceptual amelioration, supporting EM’s plausibility.

•  “Being in the game: The Metaphysics of Video-game Characters” (with E. Olson),  early draft
  What do we refer to when we talk about video-game characters? Do they exist?  If so, what is their metaphysical nature?  This paper argues that they do exist.